Directed Energy Weapon Supply Chains

Directed energy weapons (DEWs), including high energy lasers (HELs) and high power microwaves (HPMs), have emerged as potentially transformative weapons on the modern battlefield. Recent advancements have made DEWs more capable than ever, with many systems possessing the power and range necessary to engage a wide variety of threats, more affordably than current systems. Recent conflicts in the Middle East and Europe have highlighted the importance of munitions capacity as well as the need to both efficiently and effectively counter different kinetic threats. The ability of some DEW systems to engage many targets at once with an “unlimited” magazine could yield enormous economic and tactical benefits. However, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has often wavered in its commitment to fielding DEWs at scale. As such, current DEW supply chains, including critical raw materials, the manufacturing base and workforce, and testing infrastructure are incapable of supporting DEW deployment at scale. The current DEW supply chains are only able to produce small quantities of systems with long lead times. Without a clear and sustained demand signal from DoD, and therefore a return on investment, industry is hesitant to make the investments necessary to have secure, healthy, and resilient DEW supply chains. While addressing these vulnerabilities is a formidable task, it is not insurmountable. To strengthen DEW supply chains and fulfill the potential of these cutting-edge technologies, a series of concrete steps by government, industry, and academia are necessary.

1.

weapon supply chains for the future is to provide a consistent demand signal to industry and clearly articulate its strategic goals for DEWs. The lack of consistent demand signal was raised many times by industry leaders as negatively impacting all levels of the supply chain. Existing DEW supply chains can only produce small numbers of systems with long lead times. Once DoD’s strategic goals are articulated, appropriate DEW systems should be transitioned to programs of record and multi-year contracts used to send an extended demand signal. A clear, sustained demand signal, accompanied by the overarching strategic vision, will provide industry with the assurance that they can begin to make the internal investments necessary to secure DEW supply chains for the future. 2.

to critical raw materials and goods, notably the supply of germanium, gallium, and Rare Earth Elements (REE), all of which are largely dominated by China. In order to address these vulnerabilities, gallium should be added to the national defense stockpile, steps should be taken to develop domestic gallium nitride (GaN) production capabilities, and DoD should invest in synthetic alternatives to the most vulnerable DEW materials. 3.

numbers of systems with long lead times and is insufficient to support fielding DEWs at scale. Efforts to scale up production would quickly run into issues including producing optical components (e.g., diffraction gratings, mirrors, and lenses), beam directors, batteries, and the regulatory regime governing above-the-horizon DEW testing.

demands, standardizing and clearly defining requirements for DEW systems, components, and testing, and harnessing technology from the commercial industry wherever possible. 4.

up DEW production. Optical coatings, energy production, and optics are three specific areas highlighted by interviewees as facing the greatest shortage. As such, DoD should expand existing workforce development efforts by establishing a DEW University

meet future DEW needs. 5.

vulnerabilities. While the overall financial health of directed energy companies is relatively stable, the failure of even a single company could have severe repercussions due to limited supplier concerns. Limited suppliers exist throughout DEW supply chains but especially in beam directors, adaptive optics, optical coatings, specialty optical fiber, beam dumps, ceramic laser materials, and fused silica.

companies, and cybersecurity challenges. To mitigate these risks,

supply chain failure points, the development and prioritization of overlapping components for DEW systems between different programs, and conducting regular, in-depth analysis of the financial stability and security risks of companies involved in the DEW supply chain. 6.

potential avenues for diversifying DEW critical material sources and enhancing testing capabilities. However, barriers including overclassification, and restrictive export controls often impede international collaboration. DoD should designate the Joint Directed Energy Transition Office (JDETO) as the office of primary responsibility for international collaboration on DEWs in order to streamline collaboration. At the same time, DoD should work with